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Terry Copp 
D uring the Second World War a new branch of applied science referred to as 
Operational Research (OR) emerged as a 
reasonably distinct discipline. The origins of 
this development may be found in two separate 
but related activities. Within the British 
armed services Sir Henry Tizard's Committee 
for the Scientific Survey of Air Defences, 
established in 1936, presided over the 
development of "an effective system for the 
operational use of radar"1 which went well 
beyond purely technical questions. Tizard 
was determined to apply scientific methods 
to the entire range of military activities and 
his influence was crucial in establishing 
operational research in the Royal Air Force.2 
The second source of pressure for the 
employment of scientists in the solution of 
strategic and tactical problems came from a 
loosely knit group of academics determined 
to play a larger role in the conduct of the war. 
As Solly Zuckerman has related in his 
autobiography From Apes to Warlords: 
From the time of the Munich Crisis of 
1938 there had been all manner of talk 
about how scientists were going to be put 
on some kind of register and that, given a 
war, all we would have to do was wait until 
told what our battle stations were. Nothing 
happened.3 
Zuckerman and other leading lights 
among the young s c i e n t i s t s wrote a 
"manifesto" entitled Science in War. Issued 
by Penguin in July 1940, the book asserted 
that: 
In the actual business of war, science has 
been used up to now almost exclusively on 
the technical side. . . .It has hardly been 
used, at least by us, on the more general 
and more vitally important questions of 
strategy and tactics. . . .The waging of 
warfare represents a series of human 
operations carried out for more or less 
definite ends. Seeing whether these 
operations actually yield the results 
expected from them should be a matter of 
direct scientific analysis. The ultimate 
answer is provided by victory or defeat, 
but failure to understand the factors 
contributing to that victory or defeat, and 
the degree to which each contributes, 
removes any secure ground for organizing 
further success . . . It is possible to reduce 
many of the factors in military operations 
to numerical values. Doing so provides 
problems capable of definite solution. This 
has, indeed, been done to a certain extent 
with the tactical problems of naval and air 
fighting but it could be extended to many 
more. The scientific staffs of the Services 
need to play a much larger part than they 
seem to do in the formulation and solution 
of strategical and tactical problems.4 
The publication of Science in War 
coincided with the defeat of France and 
Churchill's efforts to energize the British war 
effort. By the end of 1940 there was 
employment for all of the Zuckerman group 
though few had the opportunity to work in the 
kind of roles that the manifesto had envisaged. 
Zuckerman himself became involved in 
studies of the effects of explosions on humans 
and it was several years before his views in 
bombing policy were sought by the air force. 
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The British army was more than willing 
to employ scientists on technical matters. 
General Frederick Pile, Commander-in-Chief 
of Anti-Aircraft Command, enlisted Professor 
P.M.S. Blackett as his Scientific Advisor in 
September of 1940.5 They recruited a group 
of young scientific generalists, known as 
"Blackett's Circus," to work on improving the 
accuracy of the anti-aircraft defences. In 
March of 1941 Blackett left Anti-Aircraft 
Command for RAF Coastal Command where 
he was able to apply operational research 
techniques to a wide range of tactical as well 
as technical questions. Work on the optimum 
size of convoys, the effect of colour on the 
visibility of aircraft and the marginal value of 
aircraft cover over convoys reshaped Allied 
strategy.6 
With Blackett's departure the future of 
OR in the army was uncertain. His research 
group continued to examine the problems of 
anti-aircraft gunnery, but there was no 
suggestion of any mandate for expanding the 
scope of operational research work. In May of 
1941 the Chief of the Imperial General Staff 
did authorize the appointment of a Scientific 
Advisor to the Army Council and Sir Charles 
Darwin,7 a dis t inguished physicist and 
grandson of Charles Darwin, accepted the 
position. Darwin, and his deputy Charles 
Ellis,8 were offered broad terms of reference 
including the right to suggest "from the 
scientific standpoint methods of waging war."9 
The Directors of the various branches of the 
army, who served on the Army Council, were, 
however, quite opposed to interference in 
operational matters. 
Darwin organized an Army Operational 
Research Group (AORG) to examine a wide 
variety of questions, but the AORG was placed 
u n d e r the Air Defence R e s e a r c h and 
Development Establishment, par t of the 
Ministry of Supply.10 This ensured that they 
would have very little direct connection with 
the army. Darwin selected Basil Schonland,11 
a South African physicist who had helped to 
pioneer methods of intercepting enemy 
communication on the western front in World 
War I, as Superintendent of AORG.12 
Darwin and Schonland were determined 
to expand the scope of operational research 
and they established contact with officers in 
the various training establishments. At 
Lulworth, the Royal Armoured Corps' school, 
a Canadian scientist, Omond Solandt, had 
established a physiological lab to study tank 
design in relation to crew efficiency and 
fatigue. Solandt, a bright, inquisitive, and 
aggressive young man, quickly developed 
questions about all aspects of tank design 
and development. In June 1943 his research 
team was integrated into AORG.13 
Schonland organized a signal corps OR 
section on his own initiative. The unit 
investigated a wide range of quest ions, 
including the problems created by squeezing 
all army communications into the narrow 
high frequency band. Efforts to persuade the 
army to use very high frequency (VHF) for 
shorter ranges were only partially successful 
due to the low priority assigned to equipping 
the army.14 
A fifth section was established at the 
airborne school. Schonland had worked with 
Major-General "Boy" Browning during the 
planning of the Bruneval raid and Browning 
was quick to co-operate. Michael Swann, a 
Major Michael Swann, REME 
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Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineer 
(REME) c a p t a i n wi th an abb rev i a t ed 
Cambridge degree in Zoology and a crash 
course in radar, started work on training 
methods for night operations.15 He was joined 
by David Bailey Pike, a former schoolmaster 
recruited into OR by C.P. Snow. Pike was 
instrumental in the development of methods 
for optimizing the performance of the Rebecca-
Eureka system of radar beacons which 
airborne Pathfinder forces would use on D-
Day.16 
Swann, promoted to Major, moved on to 
the Infantry school at Barnard Castle in 
Yorkshire. The infantry section, AORS6, 
became one of the most important units of 
AORG. Significant work was accomplished 
on all the key infantry weapons, and tactical 
problems were systematically analyzed in a 
series of influential reports.17 
Four other sections were created in 
1943. AORS7 examined the effectiveness of 
artillery. AORS8 split into three specialized 
sub-units; "Mines and Obstacles," "Special 
Optical Aids" and "Flamethrowers." The basic 
work on the employment of "Wasp" and 
"Crocodile" flamethrowers was carried out by 
Schonland's team of scientists. AORS9 began 
work on time and motion studies, while a 
tenth section, "Battle Analysis," was created 
to establish methods of studying large scale 
military operations.18 
The experimental work of the AORG 
sections would be carried out in England, but 
Darwin also wanted to establish operational 
research overseas. An OR section had been 
sent to the Middle East in the summer of 
1942 but it was simply attached to General 
Headquarters in Cairo. A proposed study of 
the effectiveness of anti-tank guns was met 
with the statement that this "could only be 
studied in the battle area . . . and no officer 
from GHQ, except the Commander-in Chief, 
could visit the battle area."19 
Throughout the fall of 1942 Darwin 
tried to overcome resistance to the expansion 
of operational research onto the battlefield. 
As one of his colleagues put it: 
I t was not easy to make headway: 
operational research was a new baby in a 
family which was already over large . . . the 
extra member was not popular and but for 
the determination of the Scientific Advisor 
might well 'have been starved out of 
existence in its early life.20 
Authorization to form OR sections for overseas 
theatres was granted in November of 1942 
and David Hill, one of the original members of 
Blackett's Circus, was sent to North Africa to 
join 1st British Army. Hill was unable to 
accomplish very much and he returned to the 
U.K.21 Darwin persisted and in J u n e 1943 
No. 1 ORS (Italy) was established. 
Eighth Army in Italy was no more 
hospitable to operational research than it 
had been in North Africa. Of the fifteen 
reports prepared by the section,22 twelve dealt 
with questions related to the accuracy and 
effectiveness of artillery fire, an issue of some 
impor tance . There was , however, no 
mechanism for impressing the results of these 
s tud ie s on local c o m m a n d e r s . As one 
anonymous researcher explained: 
A new type of unit has great difficulty in 
making good headway unless it is lucky 
enough to have a powerful sponsor. In 
No. 1 ORS' case there was no such person 
and work was undertaken in a somewhat 
haphazard manner.23 
Two Canadian officers served with the 
sec t ion , Cap ta in H.H. Clayton, Royal 
Canadian Artillery and Lieutenant-Colonel 
A.B. Dove, Royal Canadian Engineers. Like 
their British counterparts they found the 
work frustrating though Clayton finally won 
the attention of Eighth Army Headquarters 
by a study of the drying rates of soils in the Po 
Valley. 
No.2 ORS, formed in July of 1943 to 
serve with 21 Army Group, was headed for a 
similar fate when Darwin's successor, Charles 
Ellis, intervened to try and establish a firm 
basis for operational research in North-West 
Europe. In the run-up to D-Day the section 
had worked chiefly as a liaison group between 
army staff officers and technical specialists 
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in the AORG. Important work on the control 
of communications in the bridgehead, where 
radio and radar sets of every conceivable kind 
would be operating in close proximity, was 
underway. Equally vital work on A. A. defences 
for the beaches and Mulberries was also in 
progress,24 but Army OR had not begun to 
deal with the kind of complex battlefield 
questions that Ellis knew operational research 
should address. 
Ellis advocated a three-tiered system 
for 21 Army Group. First he wanted a Scientific 
Advisor appointed as senior officer with ready 
access to the Chief of Staff. Second, an OR 
section with its own establishment including 
sufficient vehicles and clerical staff. The 
third tier would be the AORG in England, 
especially AORS10, the Battle Analysis 
group.25 Late in 1943 Ellis wrote to the 
newly-appointed commander of 21 Army 
Group, General Bernard Montgomery, asking 
if he, Montgomery, would "like a small team 
of scientists to observe his battles." Monty's 
full reaction to this enquiry from an unknown 
civilian can only be imagined but he was said 
to have replied with a five word message, "I 
observe my own battles."26 
Montgomery did not, however, veto Ellis' 
plan. The formal link with AORG in England 
was quite impossible, as Monty would not 
allow "outsiders" access to operational 
information, but he raised no objection to the 
addition of a Scientific Advisor to his staff, 
nor to the expansion of the OR Section. Ellis' 
choice for the position, Basil Schonland, had 
a military background, great common sense 
and considerable presence. When approached 
he was hard at work on the decoy attack on 
the Pas de Calais and other aspects of 
electronic warfare. Schonland had long been 
"unhappy about the highly technical turn the 
Operational Research Section had taken." 
He accepted the position on the condition 
that this could be changed and the promise 
that Ellis would make available " . . . any 
member of AORG whom I wanted, in uniform 
and at short notice."27 Omond Solandt was to 
take charge in Schonland's absence and this 
young Canadian became Superintendent of 
AORG for the balance of the war. 
74 
Schonland was given the r a n k of 
Brigadier which, at least theoretically, placed 
him on an equal footing with the heads of 
Monty's Intelligence and Operations sections. 
He found that "Freddie," Lieutenant-General 
Frederic de Guingand, Montgomery's Chief of 
Staff, was "kind, courteous and accessible."28 
His fellow Brigadiers had been told that he 
was there "to solve difficult problems for 
them" and they seemed quite willing to try 
him out. In a 1951 Memoir,29 Schonland 
noted that the "solving of conundrums" was 
an important subsidiary function of the 
Scientific Advisor. Most of the puzzles were 
deadly serious and technically complex. 
Others, put up by Intelligence, were similar 
to the query as to whether the enemy could 
"electrify the sea" by running leads from local 
power stations into the ocean at the landing 
beaches.30 
For Schonland the principal function of 
the Scientific Advisor was to promote the 
application of operational research to the 
ba t t le f ie ld and to e n s u r e t h a t t h e 
recommendations of the OR teams were acted 
upon. As a first step, Schonland and Solandt 
selected "the best men available" to strengthen 
No.2 ORS. Patrick Johnson,3 1 an Oxford 
Physics Don who had served with the OR 
group in the Middle East, was retained as 
C O . of the section but three new men who 
were "to turn the section on to real operational 
research" were added. The foremost of these 
was Michael Swann who put his experience at 
the infantry school to good use. 
The second addition, H.A. Sargeaunt32 
had been working with Omond Solandt on 
problems related to tank gunnery, armour, 
and mobility. Sargeaunt had developed a 
detailed knowledge of the armoured corps 
while working with a tank brigade over a 
period of several months.33 Schonland hoped 
to use his experience in addressing broad 
operational issues in armoured warfare. 
The third new appointment was a 
Canadian artillery officer, John F. Fairlie, a 
RMC and University of Toronto graduate in 
mechanical engineering. After brief service 
in an artillery field regiment, Far lie was posted 
to the AORG gunnery section in December of 
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1943.34 His work on the accuracy of field 
artillery along with his prewar experience 
convinced Schonland tha t Fairlie could 
approach the study of artillery doctrine in the 
desired manner.35 Schonland soon added a 
signals expert, and an administrative officer 
to the team. He also recalled David Hill from 
his a t t a c h m e n t to Tac t ica l Air Force 
o p e r a t i o n a l r e s e a r c h . Hill became 
Schonland's assistant on air matters, an area 
of great sensitivity. In his 1951 memoir 
Schonland emphasized the importance of an 
army commander having his own advisors on 
air matters and explained that this was the 
one area of OR work which had to be personally 
directed by the Scientific Advisor.36 
From March 1944 to la te May, 
Schonland and No.2 ORS remained occupied 
with a wide variety of familiar technical 
matters. The commanding officer Lieutenant-
Colonel Johnson was acting as Radar Advisor 
to the assault Anti-Aircraft Brigade.37 John 
Fairlie was also detached from the section to 
organize a Special Observer Party, formed at 
the last minute to study the effectiveness of 
attacks on the coastal defences.38 
Major John Fairlie, Royal Canadian Artillery. 
Resistance nestfaced by Canadians in St. Aubin. Fire 
from this gun was suppressed by close range fire, but 
the reinforced concrete position remained intact. 
(U. S. Air Force photo 72640 AC) 
Fairlie prepared the first two OR reports 
of the North-west European campaign on the 
basis of these investigations. Report No.l, 
"Self-Propelled Artillery in the Assault on the 
Beaches, 3 Cdn. Inf. Div. Sector,"39 produced 
some startling revelations. Although the Self-
Propelled Artillery regiments performed in 
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acco rdance wi th doctr ine , i t w a s evident t h a t 
"no se r ious d a m a g e w a s done to any of the 
defences by S.P. fire." In an overall review of 
the ba t t l e for t he Atlant ic Wall, Fairlie wrote: 
The defences were overcome by D. D. Tanks, 
engineer and infantry assault. The degree 
of neutralization (by the Bombardment) 
actually achieved is difficult to assess 
because of the (German) method of siting 
guns to enfilade the beach area only. As 
few guns could fire to seaward it is difficult 
to say whether the delay of the enemy in 
opening fire was due to neutralization or 
to the fact that guns would not bear. In 
any event the defences were substantially 
intact when the infantry touched down 
and the enemy were able to deliver lethal 
fire in great quantity against our troops.40 
T h i s w a s n o t w h a t t h e navy , a i r force o r t h e 
Royal Art i l lery expec ted or w i s h e d to h e a r , 
b u t i t w a s of vital i m p o r t a n c e in t he p l a n n i n g 
o f f u t u r e a t t e m p t s t o s t o r m fo r t i f i ed 
p o s i t i o n s . 
Fairl ie 's second repor t examined the 
"Employment of Royal Marine Artillery Dur ing 
Opera t ion Neptune . "41 This w a s wri t ten u n d e r 
great p r e s s u r e as the Brigadier (Staff Duties)4 2 
a t 21 Army Group H e a d q u a r t e r s w a s anx ious 
to learn abou t thei r role in the D-Day landings . 
The Royal Marine Artillery h a d come a sho re 
o n t h e t h r e e A n g l o - C a n a d i a n b e a c h e s 
equ ipped with C e n t a u r Armoured Fight ing 
Vehicles m o u n t i n g 9 5 - m m g u n s . These were 
i n t ended to provide close s u p p o r t to t he 
infantry especially in reduc ing or neut ra l iz ing 
concre te g u n pos i t ions . Fairlie found t h a t the 
C e n t a u r s h a d provided "very useful close 
suppor t" 4 3 a t b o t h Sword a n d J u n o b e a c h e s 
sugges t ing t he e n o r m o u s va lue of a imed fire 
from a heavi ly g u n n e d t a n k in in fan t ry 
a s s a u l t s aga in s t fortified pos i t ions . 
In late J u n e Fairlie a n d J o h n s o n rej oined 
the OR t e a m which h a d arrived in Normandy 
on J u n e 24 th . The sect ion messed with the 
W e a p o n s Techn ica l staff " u n d e r n e a t h an 
avenue of firs, wh ich led down to t he C h a t e a u 
on the edge of Creully, r o u n d which Main 
H e a d q u a r t e r s of Second Bri t ish Army w a s 
scat tered." 4 4 B u t no one a t Second Army w a s 
in te res t ed in OR a n d Schon land w a s still wi th 
21 Army Group Main H.Q. back in England . 
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I t w a s up to t he m e m b e r s of t he OR t e a m to 
find work for themse lves . As Michael S w a n n 
recalled it: 
In those days the bridgehead was so small 
and Second Army Headquarters so near 
the front, that we could easily drive down 
to the battle area in half-an-hour, spend a 
day there, and come back in the evening, 
to bathe in the meandering river Seulles, 
search for Calvados liqueur in Creully and 
discuss at length the great problem before 
us . 
By degrees our ideas crystallized, and a 
number of projects stood out as being 
worth some concentrated effort. Of the 
many that we turned over, the chief were, 
the location of enemy mortars, which were 
causing appalling casualties and proving 
almost impossible to deal with; the 
distribution of hits and penetrations in 
our own and the enemy's tank casualties, 
and the influence of this on tactics; the 
performance and the best method of use of 
the PIAT; the problem of dust on the 
roads, and particularly on airstrips (the 
dust in Normandy was extraordinary, and 
was wearing out certain types of aero 
engines at an alarming rate); and lastly 
the problem of mud, which in the rainy 
spells was causing great difficulties in the 
little lanes and tracks that had to be used 
as supply routes. The blessing of Second 
Army on these grandiose schemes was 
obtained, but in the end only the first two 
projects were completed. Dust was taken 
over by the Air Forces; mud, after looking 
hopeful, fell through because it became 
apparent that the ways of the Army were 
too rough and ready and liable to change 
in those hectic early days, to allow of any 
intricate planning of where roads should 
go; and the performance of the PIAT, which 
though it was often fired, seldom actually 
hit an enemy tank, turned into a series of 
planned trials which were run by the 
Weapons Technical Staff. 
Two projects however remained: the 
Mortar location and the Tank Casualty 
surveys. It is significant that neither 
were purely technical problems; nor on 
the other hand were they analyses of the 
whole or a large part of the battle. They 
were indeed midway between the technical 
and the operational; it was possible to 
isolate them, although the conditions of 
the battle were all-important.45 
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These impor tan t endeavours were 
interrupted by the bombing of Caen on the 
night of July 7th. The awe-inspiring sight of 
Bomber Command's massive effort affected 
everyone in the bridgehead. But the battle of 
July 8th was as tough, costly and limited as 
any previous battle. Swann and Sargeaunt 
set out to study the effect of the bombing on 
their own initiative, quite unaware that many 
others would be engaged in the same task.46 
Their report contained some diplomatic 
language about "the disorganization and 
morale effects"47 the attack may have produced 
but it also demonstrated how slight the impact 
of the bombing had been on the battle. 
Schonland was now in France and he 
was able to bring the report to the attention of 
de Guingand. No. 2 ORS was ordered to study 
all subsequent heavy bomber operations so 
that the army would have its own independent 
assessment of such action.48 The OR group 
looked at the bombing in support of Operations 
"Goodwood" (July 18), "Bluecoat" (July 30th) 
and "Totalize" (August 7th/8th) . Each of 
these reports provided 21st Army Group with 
important information which permitted army 
p l a n n e r s to develop a m u c h more 
sophisticated approach to the use of heavy 
bombers on the battlefield.49 
A further report, "Heavy Bombing in 
Support of the Army" provided a summary of 
what the OR team had learned about the 
subject in the summer of 1944. Bombing, 
they insisted, should be examined under three 
distinct categories, "obstruction, destruction 
and demoralization." Obstruction involved 
the blocking of enemy movement, particularly 
in the con tex t of Normandy , enemy 
withdrawals. The report noted that "the 
pattern on the ground of an attack by British 
77 
A PIAT and crew. 
(IWMB6185) 
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bombers is much the same size (1000 yards 
diameter) whatever the weight of the attack." 
It was the fact that the centre of the pattern 
was "often wrongly placed," not the individual 
crew's wide shots, that presented a safety 
problem to friendly troops. Given the wide 
dispersion throughout a 1000 yard circle 
(quite apart from incorrect aiming points) 
heavy bombing should, they wrote, "be 
confined to genuine area targets."50 
brief t ime "no b o m b i n g a t t a c k wi th 
demoralization as its primary object should 
be arranged unless it can in fact be readily 
followed up." Here were the elements of a new 
doctrine for the use of the heavy bombers in 
support of the land battle. Unfortunately at 
the end of August General Eisenhower lost 
control of the strategic air forces which 
returned to their preferred task of bombing 
targets in Germany. 
A Typhoon takes off on a mission carrying its potent load of eight 3-inch rockets. 
(CFPU PL 42738) 
There were real possibilities in using 
the heavies to obstruct German withdrawals 
and the OR team provided specific guidance 
on the number of bombs required for various 
types of localities. Howeyer, the destructive 
effect of bombs, that is the actual destruction 
of enemy troops and equipment, was so small 
that it "was the moral effect which must be 
utilized if heavy bombing is to prove really 
useful." Since morale was only affected for a 
78 
If the work on heavy bomber targets 
could no t be immed ia t e ly app l i ed i t 
nevertheless provided a foundation for other 
studies of the battlefield. Schonland had 
long been anxious to know something concrete 
about the effectiveness of fighter and fighter-
bomber close support. This was an issue 
which was causing much difficulty between 
the army and air force and 21 Army Group 
badly wanted to know what was going on. 
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Major D.F.B. Pike, who had been a research 
officer at the Air Branch of 21 Army Group, 
was attached to the OR section to help with 
this work.51 
On August 8th word came that the team 
was to proceed to the town of Mortain in the 
American zone. Here, the RAF proclaimed, 
the tactical air force had been "a decisive 
battle winning factor" in stopping the German 
counterattack to cut off the American troops 
south of Avranches. According to Air Marshal 
Coningham, the commander of Second 
Tactical Air Force (2nd TAF), rocket-firing 
Typhoons claimed to have destroyed 89 tanks, 
probably destroyed another 56 tracked 
vehicles, set on fire 104 motor vehicles and 
saw 47 motor vehicles smoking. These claims 
do not include 56 enemy tanks damaged and 
81 motor vehicles damaged.52 It had been, 
the air force insisted, "The Day of the 
Typhoon." 
The army OR section was not the only 
group headed for Mortain. When Second 
Tactical Air Force was formed in 1943 it 
acquired operational research staff from 
Fighter and Army Co-operation Commands. 
Fighter Command had a good deal of 
experience with OR work and had amassed 
considerable information about attacks on 
ground targets. For example, in early 1943 a 
full scale model of a German artillery division 
with 48 mock guns and 558 dummy soldiers 
was created. "Every effort was made to aid 
the fighters and fighter-bombers in their 
attack task, but neither Mustangs strafing, 
nor Typhoons firing their new rockets with 60 
lb. warheads were able to inflict more than 
negligible damage on the position. "53 A second 
experiment with a mock-up troop of medium 
artillery produced equally dismal results. 
A carefully controlled study of the ability 
of pilots to find specific positions on the 
g round p roduced even more s t a r t l ing 
information. Tactical Memorandum No.30, 
dated March 1943, reported that: 
fighters, given a six-figure map reference 
were unable to spot well camouflaged 
guns even when the guns were actually 
firing . . . attacks on gun positions give 
negligible results for a high wastage and 
should only be ordered in an emergency.54 
After 2nd TAF was established, OR 
studies continued to show that there were 
very real problems in attacking the kind of 
targets which were of interest to the army. 
Operations against a variety of targets were 
carefully examined in the pre-D-Day period. 
Typhoon rockets were found to hit a viaduct 
500 yards long and 8 yards wide, one in 
fifteen times. Bombs dropped from fighter-
bombers scored hits one in eighty-two times. 
Rocket Projectile (RP) attacks on gun positions 
produced results varying from 110 rockets 
fired at a casement in Courseulles-sur-Mer 
with zero hits to two hits out of 127 at 
Fontenay. Second TAF found all this 
disappointing, particularly since none of the 
targets had been "well-defended."55 
The Allied Expeditionary Air Force 
(AEAF) established a school for training fighter 
pilots in close support during 1944. Results 
were not encouraging, for while strafing was 
"outstandingly successful" in damaging or 
destroying soft-skin vehicles, bombs and 
rockets could not be delivered accurately by 
average pilots. Near misses, it was found, did 
little damage. Even worse, accurate target 
location and identification of friendly troops 
proved to be an art which was readily mastered 
by very few pilots.56 
The AEAF concluded that the probability 
of pilot error and the likely inaccuracy of 
rocket and bombing attacks meant that close 
support of army operations should only be 
ordered in an emergency. Interdiction well 
beyond the battlefield, armed reconnaissance 
and the search for targets of opportunity 
would be the normal role of the fighter-
bombers. Nothing in the first two months of 
the campaign had altered this view, but if the 
Typhoons had really stopped the German 
armour at Mortain, the whole question of 
close support needed to be reopened. 
The two rival OR groups began work at 
Mortain as soon as the German retreat cleared 
the area. For eight days, August 12th to 
A u g u s t 2 0 t h , a no t en t i re ly fr iendly 
competition to locate and examine German 
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tanks, self-propelled guns and other vehicles 
was underway along the roads and lanes of 
the hilly countryside. Descriptive accounts 
of the battle, as well as air force claims, had 
p r e p a r e d the s c i en t i s t s for scenes of 
devastation. A Panzer division, it was said, 
had been caught in a traffic jam caused by the 
crash of an allied aircraft onto the lead tank 
in the column. Scores of panzers had been 
destroyed near St. Barthelmus and this was 
jus t one among many stories that everyone 
had heard. 
What the researchers saw was very 
different. Despite the most systematic search, 
very few wrecked tanks could be located. The 
army team borrowed an Auster aircraft to 
conduct a survey, but not a single additional 
vehicle was seen. In the end only 33 Panthers, 
10 Mark IVs and 3 self-propelled guns were 
uncovered. If armoured troop carriers, 
armoured cars and tank recovery vehicles 
were added, the total for all armour left behind 
in the area was seventy-eight. Nor was it 
possible to find many of the motor vehicles 
which the air force had claimed to have 
destroyed. Only thirty German trucks were 
available to investigate.57 This was difficult 
enough to account for, but the results of the 
individual examination of vehicles was even 
harder to explain. Nineteen of the forty-three 
tanks had definitely been destroyed by U.S. 
Army units. Only seven tanks showed signs 
of being struck by rocket projectiles. Two had 
been disabled by U.S. Air Force bombing, 
seven had been abandoned without a mark 
on them, and four had been destroyed by 
their crews. The fate of jus t three tanks was 
judged to be from unknown causes.58 
The Army OR group was quite prepared 
to accept the argument that air power might 
be credited for some of the abandoned and 
crew-destroyed tanks. Their report, however, 
noted that these tanks could not be taken 
into consideration When comparing pilots' 
claims of having destroyed or damaged 
vehicles.59 Major Pike's dispassionate 
analysis of the evidence angered the RAF and 
provoked outrage at 2nd TAF headquarters. 
The Army OR group agreed that the 
Allied Air Forces had a "considerable effect" 
80 
on the German attack at Mortain. But nothing 
remotely resembling the air force claims could 
be justified. Indeed, in many areas of the 
battlefield, no signs of the characteristic RP 
crater could be found. The RAF ought to have 
accepted this view for it knew from its own 
recent research that there were serious aiming 
problems with RP (and bomb-equipped) 
Typhoons. 
A study on the "accuracy of attacks . . . " 
had been completed in June 1944. It showed 
that under the most favourable conditions, 
average pilots were lucky to concentrate their 
rockets in a circle 150 yards in diameter. The 
report stated: 
In order to hit a small target with R.P. the 
pilot must be at the right height and dive 
angle, have the correct speed, have his 
sight on the target and the right angular 
depression on his sight, make the correct 
wind allowances and be free from skid or 
'g'. . . .All of these factors are important 
but it is very difficult for a pilot to have 
them all right at the same time. . . .60 
The report raised the question of what 
really happened in combat when the pilot was 
also being harassed by anti-aircraft fire. It 
concluded that previous views of the accuracy 
of RP attacks and of dive bombing (which was 
even more subject to aiming error) were wrong. 
Such ideas must have been based on "the 
pe r fo rmance of a few very keen and 
experienced pilots who can hit small objects, 
such as tanks, with R.P.'s." Such men might 
be grouped into a "corps d'élite" capable of 
attacking special targets but only continual 
training and practice could improve the 
accuracy of most of the TAF pilots.61 
The rival OR teams now raced north to 
examine the battlefield around Falaise and 
the roads leading to the Seine crossings. 
Here there were thousands of wrecked vehicles 
to investigate and a new round of argument 
over the role of air power to be waged. The 
army investigators would once again report 
that their three-week investigation established 
beyond dispute that the devastation of the 
German forces in the area known as "the 
Shambles" was not primarily due to direct air 
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A British 5.5-inch gun in action. 
(NACPA 112364) 
attack. Only 11 of 171 armoured fighting 
vehicles examined had been hit by bombs or 
rockets. No doubt the air force had assisted 
in destroying German morale — strafing had 
accounted for a third of all soft-skinned vehicle 
losses — but, in the words of the OR report, 
the destruction of the German army had been 
achieved by "land action."62 
The investigation of the Mortain battle 
continued to produce sparks. After one 
par t icu la r ly na s ty exchange, Brigadier 
Schonland suggested that "unless there were 
fairies in Normandy who could remove a large 
formation of tanks from the Mortain area,"63 
it was time to accept the evidence and act on 
the basis of fact, not fiction. But in the 
summer of 1944, 2nd TAF was in no mood to 
discuss the issues raised by Army OR. In an 
official "Addenda" to the Army's Report the 
Air Force insisted that: 
It would be wrong to regard the data 
provided in this report as yielding 
information on which to make 
recommendations for changes in weapons, 
tactics or operational doctrine, although 
the factual side of the report can itself be 
accepted.64 
If it was not permissible to use accepted 
data as the basis for recommendations about 
"changes in weapons, tactics or operational 
doctrine" then there was little point to further 
investigation of tactical air power. However 
21 Army Group was not about to give up its 
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attempts to influence tactical air doctrine. A 
formal agreement was negotiated between 
Schonland and 2nd TAF which provided for 
joint investigations of air operations against 
ground targets. 
Air Force and Army OR researchers 
prepared four Joint Reports in the fall and 
winter of 1944-45.65 Again there was no 
disagreement about the evidence. For example 
in Joint Report No.3 titled "Rocket Firing 
Typhoons in Close Suppor t of Military 
Operations" it was found that 350 rockets, 
involving 44 sorties, would have to be fired at 
a small gun position to obtain a fifty percent 
chance of a hit.66 If Typhoons were to be 
employed in a close support role they were 
best used to reduce enemy morale and raise 
the morale of allied infantry. Both doctrine 
and the manner of planning operations needed 
to be revised to take account of this. 
Extensive research was also undertaken 
on artillery methods. John Fairlie had to be 
hospitalized in England in September 1944 
and was not able to return to the section. He 
was replaced by Major J.G. Wallace and 
Captain G. Mathieson, two Royal Artillery 
officers with AORG experience. Their first 
investigation, which looked at the accuracy 
of a large predicted shoot in the Canadian 
attempt to clear the Breskins Pocket, "proved 
nothing short of a bombshell." The report 
"showed the grossest of inaccuracies in many 
of the concentrations, far greater than ever 
had been suspected."67 Fortunately the senior 
artillery officer at First Canadian Army 
Headquarters, R.A. Brownfield, was anxious 
to make use of operational research and the 
OR team worked closely with First Canadian 
Army until the end of the war. 
When the section was disbanded in 
July 1945, it had completed more than forty 
reports. Michael Swann, reflecting on what 
had been accomplished, was convinced that 
Operational Research had much to contribute 
to clearing up the uncertainties of war, yet he 
was equally convinced 'that the team's work 
had not been sufficiently apprecia ted . 
Schonland, who was in a better position to 
judge, disagreed. He insisted that OR had 
influenced many aspects of 21 Army Group 
operations. 
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. . . the great things that the ORS did was 
to show that . . . operational research 
section[s] have as their first duty the rapid 
application of lessons learned from 
operations and they are able to derive 
such lessons in a form which will carry 
conviction. Every C-in-C and his Chief of 
Staff in a future campaign should be given 
a copy of Operational Research in 
Northwest Europe . . . 
Whether future C-in-Cs read the report 
or not, Schonland was right about the success 
of OR. A new discipline had been created and 
henceforth no modern military force would 
attempt to function without the aid of an 
operational research team. Scientists had 
earned the right to bring their methodologies 
to bear on the art of war.68 
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